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L o c k , S t o c k , a n d I c e b e r g s ? 
D e f i n i n g C a n a d i a n S o v e r e i g n t y 
from Mackenzie King to 
Stephen Harper 
"Sir John A. Macdonald ... saw Canada from East to West. I see a 
new Canada - a Canada of the North." 
John Diefenbaker, 1958 
"Canada regards herself as responsible for all mankind for the 
peculiar ecological balance that now exists so precariously in the 
water, ice and land areas of the Arctic Archipelago." 
Pierre Elliot Trudeau, 1969 
"Arctic waters are Canadian waters, and Canadian waters are 
sovereign waters. Canada will defend its sovereignty." 
Paul Martin, 2005 
W
hen announcing his government's plans to construct a fleet 
of Arctic patrol ships in July 2007, Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper declared that "Canada's Arctic is central to our 
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DEFINING CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY 
national identity as a northern nation. It is part of our history. And it 
represents the tremendous potential of our future." 1 This northern 
sentiment has been a common feature in the history of a nation which 
announces itself as the "True North Strong and Free." From the dawn 
of the Cold War, the point at which the issue of Arctic sovereignty first 
gained national prominence, to the present day, Canadian 
governments have consistently voiced their uncompromising 
dedication to the defence of Canada's northern heritage. The Arctic, as 
Brian Mulroney once put it, was Canadian, "lock, stock, and icebergs."2 
But to what extent has this universally professed concern been 
reflected in the actions and policy of Canadian governments? 
Historically, Canadian policy has never matched its rhetoric in 
the Arctic. Regardless of how fervently politicians announced 
Canadian sovereignty, few have ever been willing to answer the hard 
questions associated with it or to stand up to the consequences of their 
declarations. Successive prime ministers may claim the Arctic to be 
inherently Canadian, but how do we define the Arctic, and by what 
right do we claim it to be Canadian? These are not trivial questions; 
indeed, the answers define the nature of Canadian sovereignty. Yet for 
decades they were avoided, along with any official claims. To have 
defined and asserted a real claim carried heavy costs, both financial 
and political. It meant dedicating the resources needed to assert that 
claim and dealing with the political repercussions which could result 
from it, a burden that Canadian governments have traditionally been 
loath to assume. 
In an age where competition in the Arctic is becoming more intense, 
with states vying for control of vast natural resources and potential 
shipping lanes, the issue of Arctic sovereignty can no longer be one of 
secondary concern. Canada can no longer dismiss the burdens which go 
hand-in-hand with sovereignty. It must decide how important the Arctic 
truly is to the nation and be ready to stand behind that decision. 
THE END OF THE ARCTIC'S SPLENDID ISOLATION 
The issue of Arctic sovereignty first gained real prominence in Canada 
with the start of the Cold War. The region's strategic location, nestled 
between the two superpowers, placed it directly beneath the polar air 
routes which American and Soviet bomber fleets would take in the 
event of war. This fact was not lost on Washington; by 1946 the 
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Canadian government had received a host of American requests 
seeking to increase their military presence in the region. The prospect 
of American servicemen operating anywhere in Canada during 
peacetime offended nationalist sensibilities; however, an influx of 
Americans into the Arctic truly worried Mackenzie King's government. 
Ottawa recognized its claims in the region to be shaky, and with 
Washington pushing for more naval exercises, weather stations, 
reconnaissance flights, and airbases, Ottawa worried that its 
sovereignty might not survive this American assistance. 
Canada's control over the Arctic was tenuous, in regards to both 
its legal title and its physical control. The claim was based primarily on 
British exploration, effective occupation, and the sector principal. This 
principal assumed the use of meridians of longitude running from a 
state's eastern and western extremes extending to the pole. A l l territory 
bracketed by these lines (discovered or not) supposedly belonged to 
that state. It was a theory of very questionable standing in international 
law. Actual physical control over the region was exercised by only 111 
RCMP officers and men, with many large islands in the Northern 
Archipelago simply left abandoned.3 It was also feared that new Arctic 
islands could be discovered by American patrols, making an over-
reliance on the right of discovery dangerous. Leaked American reports 
describing Canadian occupation as "meager and sporadic" and 
deliberating the annexation of some uninhabited Canadian islands 
greatly added to these concerns.4 
The situation seemed to call for a clarification of official Arctic 
policy and a more forceful assertion of Canadian control. Instead, what 
began to develop was a policy of purposeful ambiguity. Rather than 
demand, or even request, American recognition of Canadian 
sovereignty, the issue was kept in political limbo. A more forceful Arctic 
policy would have required money to establish a larger Canadian 
presence north of 60 degrees; it could also have provoked a political 
confrontation had Washington chosen to challenge Canadian claims. 
These costs were deemed too high, and rather than actively 
addressing the issue, it was assiduously avoided. As early as 30 May 
1946, the legal division of the Department of External Affairs had 
advised against making any direct claims. When Lester B. Pearson, 
then Canadian ambassador to the United States, requested permission 
to broach the subject in Washington, he was expressly forbidden to do 
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so.5 This aversion, both to political confrontation and to the dedication 
of resources to the Arctic, was a continuing pattern. 
THE DISTANT EARLY WARNING LINE 
This policy was seen most clearly during the construction of the 
Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line in the mid-1950s. The construction 
and staffing of this chain of radar stations was an enormous 
undertaking, requiring a huge influx of American workers and 
servicemen into the High Arctic. Yet as a rule, the issue of sovereignty 
was never explicitly brought up, and every effort was made to avoid 
the uncomfortable subject. As was the case during many of the defence 
projects of the 1940s, Canada invested a great deal of effort into 
generating the appearance of Canadian control. Information was 
tightly regulated, and a great deal of attention was paid to how the 
media portrayed American activities. Yet when the issue of funding 
arose, Ottawa preferred to allow the United States to assume 
responsibility for northern defence. 
Despite repeated American requests for Canadian participation, 
the construction and staffing of the DEW Line remained almost 
entirely an American responsibility for over a decade after its 
completion in 1957. As a matter of economy and convenience, Ottawa 
simply deferred making a contribution. In 1964, Canadian defence 
liaison J.C. Brown, after completing a tour of the North, reported that 
the Canadian presence there was largely illusory. In his report, Brown 
compared Canadian sovereignty to the Cheshire cat's smile from Alice 
in Wonderland; it had become little more than an illusion which 
gradually disappeared if you looked hard enough.6 
DEFINING CANADA'S CLAIMS TO THE ARCTIC WATER 
The ambiguity and economy which characterized the Canadian 
government's position over the Arctic lands was even more noticeable 
with respect to government policy over the Arctic waters and sea ice. 
The question of who owned the frozen waters of the Canadian North 
was one which had never attracted much concern, though by the 
1950s, a dramatic increase in Arctic shipping - particularly through 
the Northwest Passage - had begun to shift concern from the land to 
the water.7 
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The first explicit mention of Canadian sovereignty over Arctic 
waters came in 1946 when Lester Pearson, still Canada's ambassador in 
Washington, published an article calling all the water and ice within 
the Canadian sector national property. But Pearson was speaking 
without authorization, and despite the existence of official maps 
showing a large slice of the Arctic Ocean within national boundaries, 
there had never been explicit mention of any Arctic waters as 
Canadian. Many politicians sided with Pearson in his application of 
the sector theory, even if no thought was ever given to how the 
government intended to monitor and defend half of the Arctic Ocean. 
By March 1956, however, Louis St. Laurent's cabinet had 
completed a quiet review of the issue and arrived at a clear conclusion. 
The cabinet dropped the sector theory and charted precisely what 
Canada's territorial and maritime claims would be by drawing straight 
baselines around the Archipelago. Straight baselines, first used by 
Norway to enclose its many fjords and channels as internal waters, 
were legitimized in international law in 1951. In certain circumstances, 
a country could draw baselines around an archipelago and claim the 
waters within as internal and under complete state sovereignty. 
This cabinet decision marked the first time a Canadian 
government was willing to formulate a precise claim with a clear legal 
foundation, despite the fact that this decision remained a secret and no 
official statement was ever made. Similar to the situation in the Arctic 
lands, to have made such a public claim would have pressured the 
government to spend the resources needed to exercise a greater degree 
of control over those waters; it may also have provoked an awkward 
challenge from the United States. 
In any case, this decision's lifespan was to be short. By June 1957, 
John Diefenbaker's Conservatives had replaced the Liberals. There was 
no effective attempt by the Conservatives to implement the Liberal 
policy or to formulate one of their own. Instead, the Conservatives 
again began to toy with the application of the sector theory in policy 
speeches which had no organizing principal other than nationalism. To 
both the public and the international community, Canadian policy 
appeared strikingly inconsistent. What one minister called high seas, 
another would call Canadian territory. Where one government 
emphasized Canadian control over the Northwest Passage, another 
would invoke the sector and claim a vast swath of the Arctic Ocean. 
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Legal terms such as internal or territorial waters were often used 
interchangeably by politicians who did not understand the difference.8 
The Canadian position seemed to change with each government and 
often even within a government. 
THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON 
For decades, Canada's aversion to investing in the Arctic relegated the 
region to a position of secondary importance, yet these actions had few 
real consequences. The government's failure to determine what exactly 
it claimed in the Arctic - and on what basis - certainly confused 
American State Department officials, while Canada's continued refusal 
to dedicate substantial resources to northern defence projects certainly 
caused a great deal of consternation in the American military. However, 
there was never any attempt by the United States to take advantage of 
Canada's confused and fragile position. Simply put, Washington needed 
Canadian co-operation in the Arctic more than it needed to annex any 
tundra or sea ice. And in the final analysis, that co-operation had to stem 
from an assurance to Canada that the United States had no intention of 
claiming sovereignty over any section of the Canadian Arctic.' 
During this period from 1945 to roughly 1958, the United States 
proved willing to implicitly accept Canadian sovereignty, giving 
Ottawa an opportunity to cement its claims. While Canadian 
ownership over Arctic lands was, by the 1950s, a fait accompli, 
sovereignty over the waters was not. Had Ottawa put forward a 
forceful claim at any time between 1945 and 1958, it is likely that 
Washington would have conceded. At the time, the United States Navy 
was still requesting permission to use the Northwest Passage for 
resupply missions, and no one had yet claimed that it constituted 
international waters. 
However, no such claim was ever made. The Arctic was not a 
priority in Ottawa, where maintaining a harmonious relationship with 
Washington and avoiding the expenses of northern activity were 
paramount. By 1958, this Canadian window of opportunity had closed. 
That year saw the voyage of the American nuclear submarine LTSS 
Nautilus to the North Pole, and with it, the beginning of Arctic sub-
marine navigation. Now easily navigable under the ice, the region 
gained a dramatic new strategic and economic importance, prompting 
Washington to reevaluate its position. 
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As such, the implicit recognition which the United States had 
previously been willing to offer Canada's nebulous water claims 
rapidly dried up. By the 1960s, the American Navy was no longer 
notifying Canada of its submarine passages, and by 1963, State 
Department hostility had aborted a tentative Canadian attempt to 
enclose the Arctic Archipelago with straight baselines. Despite these 
ominous signs, official Ottawa remained optimistic that the United 
States would eventually come around to recognizing Canadian 
sovereignty over the water without the inconvenience of having to 
actively assert a claim. 
THE VOYAGE OF THE MANHATTAN 
This optimism was shattered in the summer of 1969 when the 
American supertanker Manhattan began its first voyage through the 
Northwest Passage. Prompted by substantial oil finds off Prudhoe Bay 
in Alaska, the Manhattan's voyage was intended to test the feasibility of 
regular petroleum shipping through the Arctic to the refineries on 
America's eastern seaboard. Lacking a solid policy, or even a good idea 
of what waters it claimed, the initial response of Pierre Trudeau's 
Liberal government was weak and disorganized. External Affairs was 
forced to scour the archives in an attempt to find evidence of past 
Canadian policies which might guide them. It was discovered that, 
aside from the March 1956 Liberal cabinet directive, no Canadian 
government had ever attempted to define its Arctic claims.10 
Efforts to play down the Manhattan's voyage were unsuccessful, 
and Canadian public opinion had soon risen to an unusually intense 
nationalist fervour based on indignation at the perceived American 
challenge and a fear of oil pollution. Calls for an outright declaration 
of sovereignty bombarded the Trudeau government from all 
directions. The public, the newspapers, the opposition, and even the 
government's own Standing Committee on Indian and Northern 
Affairs all demanded that the Liberals take a strong stance in asserting 
Canadian ownership. 
However, making such a declaration would have proven difficult. 
The United States had been subtly refusing to recognize Canadian 
claims to the Arctic waters for over a decade, and American President 
Richard Nixon had made it painfully clear that his government would 
not accept any unilateral extension of Canada's maritime boundaries. 
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To have made an outright claim would surely have meant a political 
battle with the United States, economic repercussions, and possibly a 
challenge at the World Court. Such a claim would also have been costly 
to assert, as the Department of Defence realized that a great deal of 
money would have to be devoted to new icebreakers, aircraft, and 
search and rescue capability. 
Instead, the Trudeau government pursued a more innovative 
approach, the adoption of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 
(AWPPA). This legislation satisfied the popular desire for action and was 
generally accepted on the international stage. However, this functional 
approach left the question of Canadian sovereignty still unaddressed. In 
rebuffing the pressure for a clear-cut declaration of Canada's claims, 
Trudeau wrote that he had "dealt chauvinism a well-deserved blow."11 
Yet for a state to be clear on what it considered to be its borders was 
hardly chauvinism. If the government did not consider the Northwest 
Passage to be Canadian territory, it should have said so openly. 
Soon after the Manhattan incident, it became clear that Ottawa 
was trying to position the Northwest Passage as internal waters; it was 
referred to as such by the Minister of External Affairs in 1970, in the 
1971 Defence White Paper, and by the Department of Justice, first in 1973 
and again in 1975.12 Such references implied that the government had 
quietly decided to rely on straight baselines, as the Pearson govern-
ment had concluded in 1956. Yet strangely, Trudeau's Minister of 
National Defence Barnett Danson appeared to be reasserting Canada's 
claim to the entire Arctic sector in 1977 by dropping a beer bottle with 
the message "Welcome to Canada" on Soviet ice station NP-22, then 
drifting 274 kilometres off the Arctic Archipelago.13 
Once the popular uproar caused by the Manhattan died away, so 
too did government interest in the Arctic. Despite the implementation 
of the AWPPA and the increased government rhetoric about national 
sovereignty, the funds necessary to enhance Canada's position in the 
North were never forthcoming. The Canadian Forces and the Coast 
Guard, tasked with maintaining Canadian control over the region, 
were starved of resources and forced to limit their patrols and 
operations. While a great deal of political effort was put into winning 
international recognition for Canada's pollution legislation through 
both bilateral negotiations and international forums, the resources and 
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the political will to define and assert Canada's claims were always 
lacking. As such, the result of the AWPPA and the Trudeau govern-
ment's Arctic policies was largely to leave the issue suspended until the 
next crisis came along. 
THE POLAR SEA AND STRAIGHT BASELINES 
This crisis was provided by an American icebreaker transiting the 
Northwest Passage. The Polar Sea made its transit in the summer of 
1985 without requesting Canadian permission. The Canadian public 
was outraged and again demanded action. This time, Brian Mulroney's 
government did not have the issue of pollution control to divert 
attention from the matter of sovereignty. 
In response to the immense public pressure generated by the 
Polar Sea, the Mulroney government took an unprecedented step. On 1 
January 1986, the Canadian government officially drew straight 
baselines around the Arctic Archipelago, making this the first time a 
Canadian government had ever publicly defined its northern maritime 
claims. The government also promised a wide variety of Arctic init-
iatives meant to augment state authority over its newly enclosed 
internal waters. Like the Trudeau administration before it, most of 
these initiatives were ultimately discarded on the basis of cost. The 
planned fleet of nuclear submarines capable of patrolling under the 
Arctic icecap was scrapped, as was the massive Polar Class 8 
icebreaker, which had been under consideration since the late 1970s. 
However, a unique event had still taken place; a firm claim to 
Canadian sovereignty had been made. An American challenge, which 
had intimidated Canadian governments for decades, never material-
ized; there was only a low-key démarche designed to ensure that 
America's objection was noted. 
The failure of the Mulroney government to follow through on its 
promises to physically assert its new claims was a sign of things to come. 
The end of the Cold War brought the desire for a peace dividend, cutting 
into the Canadian defence budget and further limiting the power the 
Canadian government could project into the Arctic. With the demise of 
the Soviet Union, defending the region seemed less vital. Yet the 
challenges to Canadian sovereignty which had arisen during the Cold 
War did not follow the USSR into the grave; in fact, they intensified. 
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THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY-
NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND NEW CHALLENGES 
The twenty-first century saw the issue of Arctic sovereignty once again 
come to the fore and find a place of prominence on the government's 
policy agenda. As with the Manhattan and the Polar Sea, the Canadian 
populace needed a catalyst to spark their interest. This came in the form 
of global warming which, over the past decades, has been radically 
altering the Arctic environment. On average, the Arctic has been losing 
74,000 square kilometres worth of ice each year - comprising a loss of 
over two million square kilometres since the late 1970s.14 The result has 
been clear; in 1969 the Manhattan tore open its hull during its 
unsuccessful attempt to transit the McClure Strait, in 2007 that route 
was, for the first time in recorded history, completely ice free. 
The potential implications are staggering. With oil exceeding 
$100 a barrel, the Arctic's vast hydrocarbon resources may be 
profitably extracted sooner than anyone expected. The well-publicized 
Russian excursion to the North Pole in August 2007 - which saw a 
mini-submarine placing a Russian flag on the seafloor - dramatically 
demonstrated the importance other states place on the region. The 
conflict with the United States over the status of the Northwest Passage 
remains very much alive, as do border disputes over tiny Hans Island 
and in the resource rich Beaufort Sea. 
The Canadian reaction to these changing circumstances has been 
aggressive. The government seems to have made the issue a primary 
concern, promising funds for the construction of Arctic patrol craft, a 
deep-water port, a new science facility, increased surveillance, and a 
host of other initiatives meant to enhance Canada's ability to exercise 
effective control over the region. The real test of the government's 
resolve, however, whether it breaks ranks or falls into the pattern of 
history, will be measured by its willingness to carry these programs 
through to completion. 
Canada must be committed to supporting its Arctic claims with 
the resources necessary to give them substance. "Gunboat 
diplomacy" will not by itself secure Canadian claims; however, 
without the tools to monitor and police the Northwest Passage, to 
enforce Canadian pollution legislation, and to chart Canada's 
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continental shelf, other Arctic powers will have little reason to respect 
the already disputed Canadian jurisdiction. 
Government actions have always been constrained by their lack of 
assets in the Arctic. For decades, sovereignty claims were put on hold 
because supporting them would have been too expensive. This pattern 
still holds. In responding to the Russian flag-planting expedition, 
Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay was dismissive: "You can't go 
around the world these days dropping a flag somewhere, this isn't the 
fourteenth or fifteenth century."15 But the Russian expedition was more 
than bravado; it was an able demonstration of Russian capability to 
operate in the waters they hope to claim. Canada has no capability to 
match the Russian nuclear icebreaker fleet. The Canadian Coast Guard 
has only one heavy icebreaker remaining, and it will soon be forty years 
old. With stronger icebreakers of its own, the Canadian response may 
have been more forceful, but the resources available prevented any 
effective Canadian rejoinder. Russia, the United States, and even 
Denmark have Arctic capabilities superior to Canada's. Moreover, each 
of those states knows what it wants and is moving aggressively to 
secure its rights in the region. 
It is not simply new hardware that is required. What is needed is a 
fundamental change in the Canadian mindset, of which an increased 
Arctic presence is only the result. The Arctic can no longer be considered 
an issue of secondary priority. Rather, the defence of Canada's northern 
sovereignty must be a sustained national effort. Canada must be ready 
to finally answer the tough questions that accompany territorial claims; 
not only what is ours, but what is not. Surrendering any Arctic territory 
has always been very difficult for Canadian politicians; however, the 
result of exaggerated claims has traditionally been to weaken legitimate 
ones. While the boundaries of Canada's Arctic were settled in 1986, 
remnants of such exaggerated claims remain. 
When responding to the Russian flag-planting expedition, for 
instance, Peter MacKay told the CBC: "There is no question over 
Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. We've made that very clear. We 
established a long time ago that these are Canadian waters and this is 
Canadian property."16 Yet the North Pole is not established Canadian 
territory; in fact, it was explicitly excluded with the drawing of 
baselines in 1986. Canada is currently working to extend its claim to 
the continental shelf, but this claim first needs to be submitted and 
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then approved by the United Nations. Official government maps still 
reflect this harmful attitude that the entire Arctic must be inherently 
Canadian. The Department of National Resources continues to publish 
Arctic maps with borders that have not changed since 1905. These 
maps still show the entire Canadian sector as within national 
boundaries, despite the fact that no such claim exists. The baselines 
that do represent Canada's stated boundaries appear on very few 
official maps. 
The greatest folly of Canadian Arctic policy has always been the 
tendency to avoid the political and financial costs inherent in having a 
clear policy. That, however, is exactly what Canada needs in the 
twenty-first century. The nation's territorial claims must be firm and 
precise and the government committed to their defence. No foreign 
state will respect ambiguous claims nor, in an age of increasing Arctic 
activity, will the opinions of a paper sovereign carry much weight. 
Canada must take a lesson from its own history. In the face of 
opposition, Arctic sovereignty is best defended with a clear and 
consistent policy, supported by the resources necessary to demonstrate 
and assert the nation's strong interest in the region. If Canada truly 
wishes to maintain its self-image as the "True North Strong and Free," 
it will have to start showing that it takes that title seriously. 
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